Background. Great concern has arisen over the continued infection of humans with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) of the H5N1 subtype. Ongoing human exposure potentially increases the risk that a pandemic virus strain will emerge that is easily transmissible among humans. Although the pathogenicity of a pandemic strain cannot be predicted, the high mortality seen in documented H5N1 human infections thus far has raised the level of concern.
Seasonal (human) influenza is a viral disease that affects hundreds of millions of people worldwide, and based upon extrapolation from US and European data, kills between 250,000 and 1,000,000 people annually [1] . As the name implies, the disease occurs in a seasonal cycle, with the large majority of cases reported in the winter months in both hemispheres. Seasonal influenza in humans is normally a relatively mild, selflimiting disease, although severe complications can arise, primarily in children 2 years of age and younger and adults 60 years of age and older.
Just as seasonal influenza is a disease of humans, avian influenza (AI) is a disease of domestic and wild birds. Wild aquatic waterfowl and shore birds are the primary reservoirs for AI viruses (AIV), which are distributed worldwide [2] . Most AI outbreaks in domestic poultry are of low pathogenicity (LPAI) and are commonly characterized by respiratory signs and decreased production parameters (e.g., egg yield, fertility), although the severity of the disease and clinical signs vary with the virus strain and the avian species infected. Viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes have the potential to become highly pathogenic (HPAI) and periodically cause serious disease with high mortality among poultry. In the past, AIV-infected wild birds have rarely shown any signs of disease; however, S358 E. Mumford et al. some sporadic deaths and a few outbreaks with high mortality in wild birds have recently been reported. Some subtypes of both LPAI and HPAI viruses have, on rare occasions, crossed the species barrier to infect humans.
Pandemic influenza is different from both human seasonal influenza and avian influenza. An influenza pandemic is a global outbreak caused by a novel influenza strain (i.e., a strain to which most humans do not have immunity) that has the capacity to cause significant morbidity and mortality in humans. Importantly, a pandemic influenza virus must also have the capacity to be transmitted easily from human to human. It is postulated that the three pandemics of the last century all derived from AI viruses that acquired the ability through mutation or genetic reassortment to transmit efficiently from human to human. The most devastating was the so-called Spanish flu of 1918-19, with an estimated 50 million deaths worldwide. The other two pandemics occurred in 1957 ("Asian flu") and 1968 ("Hong Kong flu"), with mortalities of 1 to 2 million people (above the average mortality due to seasonal influenza). In the latter two pandemics, evidence indicates that the human seasonal influenza strain recombined with an avian strain to yield the new reassorted influenza strain.
In 2003, an outbreak of HPAI (influenza A/H5N1) in poultry began to spread throughout much of Asia. Since then, this virus has become endemic in birds in some Asian countries and has caused outbreaks in birds as well as sporadic human infections in Asia, Europe, and Africa. The global economic impact of this outbreak has been considerable so far. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), since the end of 2003 over 200 million poultry have died or been culled as part of disease control measures taken [3] . The costs for affected countries include the loss of animals, disease control measures (e.g., culling, surveillance, testing, vaccination), and the loss of domestic and foreign trade. Often, there is reduced consumption of poultry by consumers in affected countries because of fear of becoming infected. The economies of nonaffected countries are also impacted, primarily through increased surveillance and testing.
Between November 2003 and February 20, 2007, a total of 274 confirmed cases of AI H5N1 infections in humans and 167 human deaths have been reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) [4] , with Indonesia reporting the most fatalities (81 cases and 63 deaths). Although complete epidemiological data for many of the human AI H5N1 cases are not available, infection is most likely attributable to contact with infected live or dead poultry in the majority of cases [5] . The currently circulating AI H5N1 strain is still clearly an animal virus, since to date only limited human-to-human transmission of AI H5N1 has occurred, and only a few family clusters have been identified in Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Turkey. However, the concern is that this avian virus will mutate and adapt to humans or recombine with a circulating human influenza strain, become easily transmitted between humans, and initiate a pandemic. This risk potentially increases with the continual and expanding epidemic in poultry, resulting in ongoing human exposure. Although the pathogenicity of a pandemic influenza virus strain cannot be predicted, the high mortality currently seen in documented human cases thus far raises the level of concern.
Objectives In the context of the high level of global concern about the risks of AI to human health, the objective of this paper is to describe the potential exposure risks for AI at the human-animal interface and suggest ways to reduce exposure and help prevent development of a pandemic virus. It first describes some possible pathways of transmission of AIV to humans and risk mitigation, and then presents the options for control in humans.
Transmission of AIV to humans and risk mitigation

Risks to humans at the human-animal interface
Transmission of AI H5N1 viruses from poultry to humans is thought to occur primarily through contact with respiratory secretions, feces, contaminated feathers, organs, and blood from infected birds or possibly by contact with contaminated surfaces, since infective AIV has been shown to be present on or in these materials [6] . Inhalation of dust or droplets contaminated with AIV is another possible route of transmission. These exposure risks exist throughout the poultry production chain, from primary production on the farm through consumption of poultry and poultry products (hereafter referred to as the "food chain"), including in poultry farms (e.g., household-raised poultry, backyard farms, commercial production farms, egg production farms), transportation and distribution systems, live animal markets, slaughter facilities, processing facilities for poultry meat and poultry by-products (such as feathers), and wherever poultry is prepared or cooked. This food chain is depicted in figure 1. In addition to exposure risk along the food chain, exposure risk also exists for owners of fighting cocks through their extremely close contact with their animals; this has been suggested to be the source of infection for some confirmed human AI cases [5] [6] [7] . Exposure risk also exists if proper poultry culling and disposal procedures are not followed.
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Risks of influenza H5N1 at the human-animal interface Thus, human populations at risk include people exposed to potentially infected poultry or infective poultry by-products through their occupations or at home. * It is likely that the risk to humans is less from commercial agricultural production than from contact with poultry raised and slaughtered locally, at home, or in village-level production (in areas where the virus is circulating). However, it is challenging to determine specific risks and establish their relative impact, because many aspects of the pathogenesis and epidemiology of the circulating AI H5N1 virus remain unknown. Data are often unavailable, and even when thorough investigations are conducted, no clear epidemiological link may be determinable. For example, contact with avian feces used as fertilizer has recently * Under certain circumstances, specific occupational and other exposure risks may also exist through contact with biological samples, laboratory materials, and infected humans. Information is available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ avian_influenza/guidelinestopics/en/index3.html; these potential risks will not be considered here. been proposed as a risk factor; however, investigations of human cases in some countries may not include questions about handling fertilizer or gardening, or patients may not remember or notice these normal household activities. Similarly, contact with infected poultry or contaminated surfaces through daily activities such as egg collecting, household cleaning, and visiting markets may go unrecognized and unrecorded, as might other epidemiologically important events.
Maintenance of the virus in the environment probably increases opportunities for human and animal exposure, although the relative risk of exposure through environmental contamination with H5N1 is difficult to determine because of the investigation challenges described above. In general, low temperatures maintain the viability of AIV. Experimentally, AIV survives in feces for at least 30 days at low temperature (4°C) [8] , suggesting that live virus could persist in environments contaminated with poultry feces (such as poultry houses) for several weeks under certain conditions. However AIVs are easily inactivated with appropriate cleaning and disinfection procedures [9] . Although these data were mostly derived from studies of other AIVs (not H5N1), and differences in survival and inactivation of virus strains may exist, inactivation protocols are generally considered to be also effective for the circulating H5N1 strain.
Routes of transmission that have been identified and/or proposed for this virus are most effectively managed by applying risk-based control mechanisms throughout the food chain. Many possible risk mitigation measures exist at each step, so in order to evaluate which mitigations at which steps are most appropriate in a particular country or situation, the specific risks (based on the outcome of a risk assessment) as well as practical aspects should be considered [10] . Risks vary depending on the practices in the affected country. For example, differences in risk to be considered include the number of households raising a few chickens in close contact with family members, how often poultry are slaughtered at home, and the proportion of poultry marketed through live animal markets, as well as differences in local consumption patterns and eating habits. In some cases, a drastically shortened food chain (i.e., poultry raised, slaughtered, prepared, and consumed within a few square metres) must be considered.
One example of a recommended control measure for AI in live animal markets, termed "market zoning" [11] , aims to prevent exposure of both market workers and the public to respiratory secretions, feces, contaminated feathers, organs, and blood from infected birds, as well as to contaminated surfaces and aerosols generated during processing, by separating potentially contaminated areas, ideally with physical barriers. Thus, the general public is prevented from accessing areas used for poultry delivery, holding of live birds in cages, slaughtering (including de-feathering, evisceration, FIG. 1. The poultry production chain from primary production through consumption (modified from Mumford and Kihm [10] ). Risk of human exposure to H5N1 avian influenza exists all along the poultry production chain. Integration of risk mitigation measures implemented at multiple steps along the poultry production chain maximizes risk reduction. In backyard production, all steps in the chain may take place within a few square meters. The slaughter, processing, and preparation steps often all take place in live animal markets S360 E. Mumford et al. and removal of skin), processing (of carcasses, viscera feathers, and other poultry by-products), cleaning of cages, and disposal of waste materials. Consumers requesting to inspect live poultry prior to slaughter are required to accept personal responsibility for entering the animal holding area. In zoned markets, the public is also restricted from walking through potentially contaminated areas to access other parts of the market. Additional zones are established to prevent cross-contamination between different types of foods. Education is required as part of this approach, in order to teach consumers and vendors how to prevent cross-contamination in the market (e.g., not handling raw poultry and then handling ready-to-eat foods such as fruits or vegetables). Market zoning is one of several possible measures to be considered in developing an integrated system of controls for live animal markets.
Risks of improperly prepared poultry
The majority of human exposure risk for AI probably exists at the farm and processing steps, as described above. A further possible route of exposure exists toward the end of the food chain, during preparation and consumption, since HPAI H5N1 has been shown to be disseminated throughout the carcasses of infected poultry [12] . The virus can also be present inside and on the surface of eggs laid by infected birds [13] , although this risk is naturally mitigated somewhat because chickens (but not ducks) ill with HPAI generally stop laying eggs [14] .
The risks associated with preparation of poultry and poultry products from HPAI H5N1-infected carcasses include the generation of aerosols during cutting and chopping, spattering of infective materials into mucous membranes, and hand-mucous membrane contamination. Although some reports suggest that humans infected with H5N1 AI were exposed to the virus through these activities [15, 16] , to date this association remains inconclusive. However, as discussed above, capturing exposure data through epidemiological investigations is difficult.
Sufficient data are not available to determine if humans can be infected with HPAI H5N1 via the oral route. However, the consumption of raw or inadequately cooked poultry products was identified as a potential mode of transmission after two human AI H5N1 cases in Viet Nam were attributed to the consumption of raw duck blood [17] . Zoo felids became infected with AI H5N1 after they were fed raw poultry carcasses at a time when many chickens in the area were dying of H5N1 infection [18, 19] , and laboratory studies showed infection in cats fed raw meat contaminated with HPAI H5N1 [20] , further suggesting the possibility of the food-borne transmission route. It is not clear whether the infection in these instances occurred within the digestive tract, as occurs in "traditional" food-borne diseases, or via other possible exposure routes (e.g., oral or upper respiratory mucous membranes ). Consumption risk would also apply to food products crosscontaminated with AIV through contact with infected birds and infective poultry products. Until more data are available, the risks associated with consumption of raw poultry cannot be determined.
However, there are no epidemiological or experimental data to suggest that the currently circulating H5N1 virus can be transmitted once food has been properly cooked. Based on studies showing that AIV infectivity is inactivated at 70°C [21] , WHO and many national food-safety agencies are stressing the importance of cooking poultry and poultry products to 70°C in all parts of the food item. If a thermometer is not available, it is recommended that poultry be cooked until the meat is no longer pink. Thorough cooking inactivates not only AIV, but also other pathogens (e.g., Campylobacter, Salmonella) that may be present. Similarly, it is recommended that eggs from areas with HPAI outbreaks in poultry not be consumed raw or partially cooked (i.e., with a runny yolk) nor used as ingredients in foods that will not be adequately cooked.
From epidemiological data, scientific studies, and microbial risk assessments, it is known that undercooking, contamination, and cross-contamination are hazards that commonly occur during food preparation in the household [22] . Therefore WHO developed simple key messages that can be used in national food safety consumer education campaigns for AI as well as other food-borne pathogens (box 1). BOX 1. Recommended good hygienic practices to reduce exposure to AIV and reduce spread through food Separate raw meat from cooked or ready-to-eat foods to avoid contamination. Do not use the same chopping board or the same knife for raw meat and other foods. Do not handle both raw and cooked foods without washing your hands in between and do not place cooked meat back on the same plate or surface it was on before cooking. Do not use raw or soft-boiled eggs in food preparations that will not be heat-treated or cooked.
Keep clean and wash your hands. After handling frozen or thawed raw chicken or eggs, wash your hands thoroughly with soap. Wash and disinfect all surfaces and utensils that have been in contact with the raw meat.
Cook thoroughly. Thorough cooking of poultry meat will inactivate the virus. Either ensure that the poultry meat reaches 70°C at the center of the product ("piping" hot) or that the meat is not pink in any part. Egg yolks should not be runny or liquid.
Do not eat raw poultry parts or raw eggs.
Source: Adapted from the WHO 5 Keys to Safer Food [23, 24] 
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Risks of influenza H5N1 at the human-animal interface Integration of several risk mitigation measures implemented at multiple steps along the food chain maximizes risk reduction but requires that authorities responsible for animal health, public health, and food safety (as well as other sectors) work together [10] . For example, implementing AI surveillance in poultry farms (animal health sector) and improving disease and food safety awareness of consumers (public health sector) in association with implementing market zoning (interface aspect) reduces risks to public health more than any one measure implemented alone.
Other human-animal interface risks
Since late 2003, confirmed or suspected H5N1 cases have been reported in felids (both domestic cats and captive wild feline species) [18, 19, [25] [26] [27] , as well as in a mink [28] and a stone marten [29] . It is hypothesized that exposure occurs while animals are scavenging infected avian carcasses. Personal communications from field veterinarians in Azerbaijan and Turkey during the human and animal outbreaks of H5N1 also mentioned possible infection of dogs, and the death of a dog in Thailand that was infected, presumably after eating a HPAI-infected duck, was recently reported [30] . To date no human infections have been linked to exposure to infected mammals.
The role of wild birds in the spread of AI H5N1 is not yet clear, despite ongoing study. At least one human AI infection was most likely due to close contact with wild birds [31] . A variety of LPAI strains are commonly isolated from healthy wild waterfowl, although HPAI strains, including H5N1, are rarely found on routine (non-outbreak-related) surveillance of wild birds [32] . However, H5N1-infected wild birds have been found dead, including in areas where outbreaks of H5N1 have occurred. More information is needed regarding wild bird migratory routes, high-density areas, pathogenesis, and contact with domestic birds in order to better understand the role of specific populations of wild birds in the spread of AI H5N1 and other AIVs. This information could then be linked to data on poultry and human densities in order to conduct risk assessments and map possible high-risk areas for human exposure.
Control of disease in humans
It is not possible to predict when the next influenza pandemic will occur, the severity of disease it will cause, or even the influenza virus strain that will cause it. Concerns about the current sporadic AI H5N1 infections in humans center around the high mortality rate and the fact that the virus has almost certainly been transmitted from human to human in a few cases [33] . This transmission probably involves extremely close contact, and although there have been several family clusters of human cases, in most clusters it has been very difficult to ascertain whether all were exposed to the same source (e.g., infected poultry or environment) or whether direct human-to-human transmission may have occurred. Interestingly, the vast majority of the clusters have been among blood relatives in a family, leading some to propose that H5N1 transmission from bird to human requires some uncommon specific, perhaps genetic, host attributes.
The exact mode of development of a pandemic remains unknown, but clear evidence of the involvement of bird viruses in past pandemics exists. Thus, the ongoing circulation of AI H5N1 virus raises concerns about the generation of another human pandemic. Control of the disease at the animal level and at the human-animal interface is most efficient; however, controlling the disease in animals and exposure of humans continues to be difficult. Therefore, preparations to protect human health in other ways must be initiated. Efforts at developing vaccines for so-called prepandemic or interpandemic phases have been under way for several years. The most promising approach is the use of "reverse-genetics" recombinant systems [34] [35] [36] that use a known "backbone" of six genes from the typical seasonal influenza strains combined with the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of the specific virus to which the vaccine would be made. Such systems allow formulation of virtually any influenza virus subtype combination. For the H5N1 strain, investigators have genetically modified the hemagglutinin to reduce its virulence for birds and have placed the two genes in the vaccine prototype system. In 2006, WHO recommended several vaccine candidate strains [37] intended to protect against all of the circulating H5N1 viruses.
This vaccine approach is expensive and may not ultimately result in development of an appropriate candidate strain until a pandemic actually begins and the correct strain can be definitively identified and incorporated. However, many public health authorities feel it is important to make the effort to stockpile some vaccines against the potential of a pandemic, and using the circulating H5N1 is currently the most logical choice. Vaccines against the AI H7 and H9 strains that have infected people are also under development.
The second pharmaceutical approach to protect against development of a pandemic is the rapid deployment of antiviral drugs in a planned and concerted manner to stop human-to-human transmission very early, before spread is widely disseminated [38, 39] . Thus, WHO has developed a containment plan and stockpiled antivirals in anticipation of containing an outbreak wherever it may develop. One problem with the use of antivirals is that virus strains can arise that are resistant to the commercially available drugs, although precise and ongoing virus surveillance to S362 E. Mumford et al. identify resistance mutations, early intervention, and having multiple drugs available could still allow effective antiviral containment of a developing pandemic. Another limitation to antiviral containment is that current surveillance systems in many countries may not allow for the timely detection of human cases, and thus the initial spread of a pandemic strain may be missed.
Both affected and at-risk countries should have national preparedness plans in place that consider the availability of vaccines and antivirals, active surveillance in human and animals, and other national factors. Effective national preparedness for a potential influenza pandemic requires ongoing collaboration among the public health and animal health sectors at all levels from policymakers to consumers and farmers and poultry-owning households. Other governmental sectors, such as education, trade, and the military, as well as international organizations, universities, nongovernmental organizations, research centers, and industry, play an important role and should be included within national contingency plans.
Conclusions
In addition to decreasing the amount of AIV circulating in populations of poultry, control measures should minimize the risk of human exposure. Authorities responsible for human health, animal health, and food safety, as well as other stakeholders along the food chain, should integrate their response to HPAI H5N1 and other strains of AIV that can infect humans. Integration and collaboration will ensure that adequate and appropriate control measures are developed for reducing the risk of AIV transmission throughout the food chain and wherever poultry and humans interface.
